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Abstract 
Robustness evaluation of bridges within a risk-based framework requires estimation 
of the probability of occurrence of different hazards followed by an assessment of the 
vulnerability of the bridge with respect to those hazards, as well as quantification of 
the consequences of potential failure. The first part of the paper deals with a statistical 
analysis of past metallic bridge failures which can aid towards identifying the 
principal hazards affecting the bridges and their associated vulnerability. The results 
show that natural hazards, design errors and limited knowledge are amongst the most 
commonly encountered causes of collapse in metallic bridges, followed by accidents 
and human error aspects other than in design. When analysed chronologically, the 
data demonstrates a decreasing trend for collapses attributed to limited knowledge and 
an increasing trend in failures resulting from accidents and natural hazards. The paper 
continues by presenting a categorisation procedure through which consequences 
arising from potential bridge failures can be estimated. Associated models for 
quantifying their magnitude considering both spatial and temporal domains are 
highlighted. Finally, the predictive capability of the models is outlined through a case 
study.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Studying past failures can be useful in mitigating the incidence and potential of future 
adverse events. A first step towards understanding and quantifying the risk of bridge 
failures can be provided by acquiring knowledge on possible failure mechanisms of 
existing structures and the root causes of collapse. Trends revealed through statistical 
analysis can aid in identifying the potential of the most significant hazards affecting 
bridge structures and help in planning against their consequences. An overview of 
past efforts in establishing databases of bridge failures and analysing them statistically 
is presented in [1]. These investigations covered all types of bridges without making a 
distinction between different constitutive materials.  
 
The aim of the present study is to synthesise and classify structural collapses in 
metallic bridges in particular, starting from the early 19th century up to the present 
time. A database of such cases was extracted from published literature, the internet 
and various news reports. Statistical analysis of the database was carried out in terms 
of identifying the factors contributing to the collapse and the modes of failure of this 
particular bridge type and associated forms. A discussion on the significance of 
consequence analysis in risk-based assessments follows, presenting general guidelines 
on how consequences of bridge failures can be categorised and quantified. 
 
2. ANALYSIS OF BRIDGE FAILURE DATA 
A total of 164 cases of failure of metallic bridges were retrieved from the study in [2]. 
Of these 53% were highway bridges, 34% were railway bridges and a small 
percentage were footbridges. Of the 164 reported cases, 87 (51%) were classified as 
‘collapse’, 73 (47%) as ‘no collapse’ and 4 (3%) as unknown. For the purposes of this 
study, ‘collapse’ is defined as one or more structural elements falling down from the 
bridge as a result of the failure, rendering the structure incapable of remaining in 
service. ‘No collapse’ covers the cases that have resulted in loss of function (such as 
fatigue cracking which could result in collapse if left unchecked) and have caused 
bridge closures, repairs or strengthening works. Considering the cases which resulted 
in collapse, about two thirds took place while the bridge was in service, whereas the 
remaining occurred during construction. It should be noted that in compiling the 
database, cases for which damage/collapse was attributed to earthquake action or wars 
have been excluded. However, other natural hazards (e.g. flooding, extreme wind) are 
included. This paper focuses on the failure cases where bridge collapses took place. 
More details regarding the ‘no collapse’ cases are provided in [1]. 
 
The causes of failure have been divided into seven categories. The first three are 
limited knowledge, design errors and other aspects of human error; the remaining four 
are natural hazards (excluding earthquakes), accidents, overloading and deterioration. 
Design errors include cases where there was evidence of incorrect design 
assumptions, wrong estimation of loads, mistakes in calculations, oversight of failure 
modes etc. Limited knowledge captures the cases where there was insufficient 
understanding of a failure mode at the relevant time, such as aerodynamic instability 
or a structural/material problem such as brittle fracture, fatigue or buckling. Failures 
due to limited knowledge usually took place with the introduction of new materials or 
new forms of design or due to severe extrapolation of what at the time had proved 
successful. Natural hazards encompass cases where failures have taken place due to 
extreme loading such as flooding, storms or very high winds. The remaining aspects 
of human errors are distinguished from design errors and cover those failures caused 
by negligence, ignorance, as well as poor workmanship, wrong assembly sequence, 
etc. Accidents pertain to vehicle and ship impacts, fire and explosions (excluding war 
actions, vandalism and terrorist attacks). Corrosion is the principal cause of 
deterioration in the case of metallic bridge failures leading to collapse. It should be 
mentioned here that, in many cases, failure is caused by a combination of causes. In 
these cases, an attempt has been made to identify as far as possible the primary cause, 
and to classify the case accordingly, though this cannot always be achieved without a 
degree of subjective judgement.   
 
Figure 1 presents the distribution of the failure causes for the collapsed bridges 
database. Out of the 87 cases, 36% of the collapses were observed in the USA and 
20% in the UK, partly due to the large number of such bridges in these countries and a 
larger number of documented cases. The most recurrent causes of failure are design 
errors (22%), limited knowledge (22%) and natural hazards (21%) with almost equal 
contribution. These are followed by accidents (14%), other human errors (13%) and 
overloading (5%). It is evident that there is no single dominant cause of collapse for 
metallic bridges, though the top three account for almost two thirds of the whole. If 
the subset of metallic bridges is compared with the database for all bridge types [2], it 
appears that limited knowledge is a more frequent cause of failure for the former 
(22%) than the latter (10%). This may be attributed to the way in which the 
technology for metallic bridges often moved in spurts, typically related to progress in 
iron/steel manufacturing and/or assembly, with structural understanding following 
suite. However, it may also be related to more intrinsic factors such as the relative 
ratios of dead-to-live loads in different bridge types and the concomitant difference in 
uncertainty levels. Natural hazards and design errors are at the top of the list for both 
databases, although the former cause appears to have a slightly reduced influence 
within the metallic bridge subset. Overloading is found to have a less profound effect 
on metallic bridges as compared to the entire bridge database. It is also interesting to 
note that only 3 collapses out of 87 appear to be triggered by deterioration problems 
which shows that corrosion is, more often than not, addressed before it has reached a 
level at which it is the primary reason for a collapse. 
 
Figure 2 presents the distribution of failure modes for the collapsed metallic bridge 
dataset. The most frequently encountered modes are scour of piers/foundations (17%), 
buckling (16%), fatigue (13%), impact (13%) and fracture (9%). Though scour is an 
important failure mode for all types of bridges, fatigue and fracture taken in 
combination appears to be the most critical failure mode for metallic bridges, closely 
followed by buckling. It should be noted that 14% of the failure modes are classified 
as unknown due to insufficient detail in the information provided. In terms of the 
distribution of the collapsed bridges with respect to their structural 
configuration/form, the majority are truss bridges (35%) and girder bridges (21%), 
partly due the fact that these comprise the largest fraction of the metallic bridge 
population. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Failure causes leading to metallic bridge collapses 
 
 
From a more detailed analysis of the data pertaining to the collapsed bridges, it was 
found that almost all collapses (13 out of 14) attributed to buckling took place during 
the construction stage of the bridge. Buckling was also found to be the most common 
failure mode associated with design and other aspects of human errors (30% and 36% 
of the cases, respectively). Looking at impact, more than half of bridge collapses (6 
out of 11) were caused by ship impacts, whereas 16 out of 18 cases of those linked to 
natural hazards were attributed to flooding, scour and hydraulic effects on the 
collapsed bridges. Clearly, there is need for more efficient design and assessment of 
bridges with respect to flood and scour conditions, especially during a period where 
changing environmental conditions have been established as a critical issue for civil 
infrastructure in general, and bridge structures in particular. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Failure modes associated with metallic bridge collapses 
 
 
Figure 3 attempts to compare failure causes for different time periods. These time 
periods were chosen in a way to cover major advances in steel bridge construction 
such as the use of cast and wrought iron (pre-1900), the rapidly increasing use of steel 
(1900-1940) and the introduction of welding in the 1940s. It can be seen from Figure 
3 that limited knowledge played a major role in the recorded collapses up to the mid-
twentieth century. This coincides with periods when fatigue, fracture and buckling 
were still not fully understood and materials with imprecisely known behaviour were 
first introduced, such as cast and wrought iron and, much more recently, high strength 
steel. These resulted in five bridges which collapsed, in that period, due to fatigue 
failure, four due to buckling of compression members and four due to brittle fracture. 
As Figure 3 shows, collapses due to limited knowledge have considerably decreased 
in recent decades with the last recorded case being the catastrophic 1970 and 1971 
box-girder bridge collapses in Milford Haven, UK, West Gate, Australia and Koblenz, 
Germany due to buckling effects. Figure 3 shows no obvious trend in terms of design 
and human errors, which is an interesting observation, given the emphasis on quality 
assurance and other human error mitigating procedures introduced in the past thirty 
years or so. Perhaps, issues related to increased complexity and required skills base, 
as well as the higher number of technical-human interfaces may counteract the 
benefits accrued from improvements in other areas. On the other hand, there appears 
to be an overall increase in the percentage of bridge collapses due to natural hazards 
and accidents over the years. The latter can be attributed to the continuous increase in 
transportation demand, both highway and railway as well as waterway ship traffic, 
which has resulted in a number of vessel impacts to bridges. The increase in bridge 
collapses due to natural hazards may be attributed, on one hand, to the development of 
infrastructure in more hazardous terrain, and, on the other, to changing environmental 
conditions and more extreme weather circumstances observed during the last decades, 
though it is speculative to suggest that this is linked in some way to climate change 
effects. It would certainly be of interest to ascertain whether the magnitude of 
environmental loads at the time of collapse was within the corresponding design 
envelope and the prevailing design code. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Cause of bridge collapses by date 
 
 
In Figure 4, the bridge collapses are divided between those that happened during the 
construction stage of the bridge and those that took place when the bridge was in 
service. As previously mentioned, two thirds of the collapses took place while the 
bridge was in service whereas the remaining one third occurred during construction. 
Figure 4 shows that design and human errors are more common during the 
construction stage but play a secondary role when compared to natural hazards and 
accidents for completed bridges. Similar statistics available for all types of structures 
[3] demonstrated that 52% of the failures occurred during construction and 48% in 
service. The difference can be attributed to the longer service life of bridges as 
compared to buildings but perhaps also to the higher skill level in construction and 
workmanship usually encountered in bridges.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Cause of bridge collapses by stage 
 
  
3. CONSEQUENCES OF BRIDGE FAILURES 
Once the likelihood of occurrence of the hazards that may affect a bridge structure is 
estimated, this should be followed by the assessment of the vulnerability of the bridge 
against these hazards and an appropriate assessment of risk. The latter also requires 
estimation of the consequences of failure, which play an essential role in both 
qualitative and quantitative risk-based design and assessment and robustness 
evaluation of bridges. Consequences of failure can often be seen as a good indicator 
of the importance of a bridge structure, given its form, function and location within a 
transport network. They can range from casualties and injuries to structural damage, 
reduction in network functionality and may also extend into environmental as well as 
societal impact. Table 1 shows that, in general, consequences resulting from bridge 
failures may be divided into four main categories: human, economic, environmental 
and social. This categorisation is consistent with Eurocode provisions [4]. Each of 
these main four categories can be further sub-divided into a number of more specific 
areas, so that itemisation and appropriate modelling, where possible, may be 
undertaken. 
 
Consequences can be classified as either direct or indirect. Direct consequences are 
considered to result from damage states of individual components. Indirect 
consequences, triggered by the former, are associated with reduction in, or loss of, 
system functionality and can be linked to the level of robustness [5]. The 
differentiation between direct and indirect consequences depends on the system 
boundaries considered in the analysis as well as on the extent of the time frame that is 
used; they may, therefore, be subjective to a degree [6].  
 
 
 
 
Consequence categories Examples 
Human Fatalities 
Injuries 
Psychological damage 
Economic Replacement / repair costs 
Loss of functionality/downtime 
Traffic delay / re-routing costs 
Traffic management costs 
Clean up costs 
Rescue costs 
Regional economic effects 
Loss of production / business 
Investigations / compensations 
Infrastructure inter-dependency costs 
Environmental CO2 Emissions 
Energy use 
Pollutant releases 
Environmental clean-up/reversibility 
Social Loss of reputation 
Erosion of public confidence 
Undue changes in professional practice 
Table 1: Categorisation of bridge failure consequences 
 
 
 
3.1. FACTORS AFFECTING CONSEQUENCES 
A modelling framework for bridge failure consequences should account for their type, 
the relevant time frame, as well as the system boundaries surrounding the structure. 
The time frame considered (days/weeks/years) plays an important role in consequence 
modelling; consequences will be different when considering only a short-term post-
event time frame or a long-term period extending well after the failure event. The 
actual duration in considering long-term periods is also expected to affect the 
magnitude of estimated consequences. For example, a bridge failure may result during 
the immediate and mid-term aftermath, in loss of business revenue and high traffic 
delay costs but over longer periods these might change as new regional equilibria are 
reached. Lastly, consequence estimation is affected by the definition of the system 
boundaries; for example, the system may be defined as solely the structural system of 
the bridge (structural domain) or it may be extended into the transportation network 
that the bridge is within (spatial domain). The extent of the spatial domain is also an 
important factor, depending on whether a single route (with diversions) or a more 
widely encompassing spatial network is considered. Here, the level of redundancy of 
the transportation network in redistributing traffic flows following the bridge collapse 
plays an important role. Further layers can be added to the above systems by 
addressing wider societal consequences such as business losses, environmental 
impact, etc. 
 
The consequences of failure vary significantly from structure to structure, and may 
depend on a range of factors which are related to the hazard itself, the structure and its 
utilization, as well as the surrounding environment. First, the source and nature of the 
hazard leading to the bridge collapse will affect considerably the consequences. It is 
expected that the greater the magnitude and duration of a hazard, the greater the 
consequences will be. The bridge type will also influence both its vulnerability and 
robustness, and, hence, the consequences, which are likely to be sensitive to factors 
such as the structural form, the material used, age and condition, as well as quality of 
construction. 
 
Bridge location is one of the major factors expected to influence the magnitude of 
failure consequences. The type of road or rail route served by the bridge influences 
the traffic intensity and, hence, the number of people exposed to any given hazard, as 
well as the traffic delay costs. Moreover, the availability of emergency services and 
accessibility to treatment for injuries will most likely be best in urban areas, hence, 
the number of fatalities may be lower in such locations. Finally, the cost of repair or 
reconstruction of the bridge structure may be higher in rural areas due to increased 
labour, materials and transportation costs. On the other hand, access might be easier 
and inter-dependency issues might be less critical than in urban areas. The time of the 
day that a bridge failure may take place will also have an effect on human 
consequences. Bridge structures will experience high levels of traffic during peak 
times and the potential for mass casualties is thus higher. 
   
3.2. QUANTIFICATION OF CONSEQUENCES 
Quantification of bridge failure consequences is, in all but the simplest of cases, 
challenging and multi-faceted. The level and sophistication of the various analysis 
types increases considerably as the range and extent of considered consequences 
widens. It is often practical to express consequences in terms of monetary units, 
though this is rarely easy to do so. Difficulties are encountered in expressing loss of 
life or injuries in monetary units and in quantifying economically social and 
environmental impacts. 
Sources for the quantification of consequences from bridge failures can be found in 
natural hazard loss estimation manuals (e.g. [7]), reports analysing past failures (e.g. 
[8]), industry and regulatory authorities guidelines (e.g. [9], [10]). An attempt to 
highlight different consequence models, and focus on their relevance in relation to 
bridge failures in the context of robustness evaluation, is made in [11]. A summary is 
presented in the following.  
 
A starting point in quantifying human consequences is to estimate the number of 
casualties and/or injuries resulting from bridge collapse. In [7], an empirical 
relationship for estimating the number of people on or under bridges, NBRDG, is 
provided as 
 
NBRDG = CDF × Commuter Population     (1) 
 
where CDF is a commuter distribution factor taking into account the percentage of 
commuters on or under bridges. Suggested values for CDF are 0,02 during peak times 
and 0,01 otherwise, and the expected number of casualties due to a bridge collapse 
may be taken equal to 7% of the value calculated for NBRDG [7]. Alternative models 
have also been proposed [12] and simplistically an estimate of casualties can also be 
obtained by considering an appropriate ‘worst case’ scenario, such as a full traffic jam 
on the bridge at the time of collapse. 
 
In addition to fatalities, a bridge failure can result in human injuries. Quantifying the 
consequences of injuries is an even more challenging task due to the wide range of 
different injuries that may result. As a result, different injury severity scales have been 
developed in the past such as the five-scale abbreviated injury scale (AIS) [12] and a 
two-scale distinction (minor/slight and major/serious) suggested by the UK transport 
regulatory authorities [10, 13]. A four-scale injury severity categorisation and 
estimated injuries falling in the different categories expected to result from a bridge 
collapse are given in [7]. Information on injury costs can be found in [14] and [15], 
whereas methods addressing the contentious issue of attributing economic values to 
deaths and injuries are reviewed in [11] and [16].  
 
Economic consequence models are, on the whole, available for bridge structures, 
especially with respect to repair/reconstruction costs, typically linked to a damage 
severity index. Reconstruction time is an important parameter since the duration of 
the unavailability of the bridge will govern the traffic delay costs in the 
highway/railway network but estimates for this duration are subject to uncertainties. 
Typical reconstruction times and associated uncertainties for different types of bridges 
are given in [7]. Typical values which may be used in estimating traffic delay costs 
for both highway and railway networks are summarised in Table 2; such values are 
expected to be different from country to country, whereas further data on traffic 
management costs can be found in [12] and [17]. All the above costs can be used, 
together with site specific information regarding traffic and/or rail service levels, to 
produce estimates of economic losses as a result of bridge restrictions or 
unavailability. Wider and long-term losses require the availability of econometric 
models, which analyse how detours and delays might affect supply and demand for 
goods and services in a region, although such estimates are expected to be 
characterised by a high degree of variability and uncertainty. 
 
Environmental consequences range from CO2 emissions associated with clean up, 
reconstruction and traffic delays to the release of toxic or other pollutants that might 
affect water or air quality and human health. Life cycle assessment analyses can be 
used to estimate typical CO2 content per tonne of construction material used in 
repair/reconstruction, with typical values given in [11, 16]. Similarly, emissions from 
traffic detours and delays can be estimated as a by-product of the economic analysis 
of such costs. Typical values of emissions from different types of vehicles per 
distance travelled can be found in [18]. If deemed appropriate, the overall emission 
quantities can be expressed through monetary units, though, at present, the range of 
values quoted for the economic cost of CO2 emissions [11, 19] is impracticably wide.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that recent events from the UK (failure of bridges due to 
flooding in Cumbria in 2009) and elsewhere have focused attention on crucial inter-
dependencies that exist between critical infrastructures. For example, loss of a bridge 
may result not only in transport being disrupted but also in other utilities (electricity, 
water) being adversely affected. Such losses are perhaps more difficult to quantify but 
should be borne in mind in evaluating the robustness of structures whose function 
provides a critical link within a multi-layered utility network [20, 21]. 
 
 
 
 
Mode Passenger Transport Freight Transport 
Car 
Business: €32,90/person-hour 
Commuting/Private: €9,40/person-hour 
Leisure/Holiday: €6,30/person-hour 
 
Light Goods Vehicle: €62,6/vehicle-
hour 
Heavy Goods Vehicle: €67,3/vehicle-
hour 
Interurban 
Rail 
Business: €32,90/person-hour 
Commuting/Private: €10,00/person-hour 
Leisure/Holiday: €5,00/person-hour 
 
Full train (950 tonnes): €1135,0/tonne-
hour 
Wagon (40 tonnes): €47,0/tonne-hour 
Average per tonne: €1,20/tonne-hour 
 
Table 2: Average European value-of-time estimates (2011 values based on [8]) 
 
 
   
3.3. CASE STUDY 
In this section, the applicability of the consequence models is outlined through a case 
study on the I-35W bridge which collapsed in 2007 and for which detailed 
information about the consequences of failure is available [8, 22-24]. Table 3 
summarises the failure consequence figures quoted in the literature compared with 
estimates, predicted from the models presented in this paper.  
 
Good agreement is found for detour costs, which is due to the similarity of the 
methodology used. Casualty predictions are higher than the actual values, particularly 
if the conservative traffic jam scenario is considered. On the other hand, the number 
of injuries was reasonably predicted, given the uncertainty levels present. The 
replacement cost prediction [7] is, however, highly inaccurate and better models 
based on construction cost per unit area could lead to substantially better agreement. 
 
It should be noted that the applicability of the models for predicting bridge failure 
consequences should be verified with additional real cases in order to assess their 
suitability and accuracy. Clearly, any predictions should address not only mean values 
but also given an estimate of their spread and variability. 
 
 
 
Consequences Observed Predicted 
Casualties 13 15-45 
Injuries 145 192 
Replacement cost $234m $20m 
Cost of detours $120m [8, 22] $115m 
Regional economic loss $60m [22]  
Traffic management costs $7m [23]  
Clean up costs $8m [24]  
Additional vehicle emissions  $25m 
Table 3: Consequences for the I-35W collapse 
 
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
A review of failure statistics for metallic bridges was presented first, with design 
errors, natural hazards and limited knowledge found to be primary factors 
contributing to past collapses. In the last few decades failures attributed to limited 
knowledge have become increasingly rare, whereas incidents attributed to natural 
hazards and accidents show an increasing trend.  Design and human errors appear to 
remain remarkably constant in percentage terms during the investigated 150-year 
period. 
 
The second part of the paper presented a categorisation of failure consequences and 
associated models for their quantification, applicable to bridge structures. The 
predictions given by the models were compared with figures quoted in the literature 
for the case of the collapse of a real bridge. The presented framework may be used for 
the purposes of risk assessment and robustness evaluation. A thorough understanding 
and justification of the appropriate system boundaries, in relation to spatial and 
temporal domains, is fundamental in quantifying consequences, and in enabling a 
rational distinction between direct and indirect components. 
 
Given the scarcity of information on structural failure consequences, investigating in 
detail selected past events should prove both instructive and valuable. Part of the 
challenge is to undertake such studies using a common framework so that meaningful 
comparisons can be undertaken, and it is hoped that this paper contributes towards 
this objective. Much work remains to be done in sifting through relevant sources and 
data, establishing commonly acceptable models and values for the various forms of 
consequences under consideration, and understanding the associated uncertainties and 
variabilities. In turn, this will help in developing necessary guidance for risk 
assessments of major bridges, and will inform the debate on acceptable risk criteria.  
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